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a
STATEMENT OF POINTS.
1. T'he Court correctly holds that the lands are subject to the
outstanding lease.
The Court correctly holds that Meagher is the transferee
of an undivided one-half interest in the rights of the lessee.
2.

3. 'The Court correctly holds that Meagher's amended reply
does not plead a new or different cause.

·· 4. The Court correctly holds that the document of October 21,
1944, transferred to Meagher the then interest of Stock.

The ·Court correctly holds that the document of transfer
was supported by a consideration.
, 5.

The ·Court correctly holds that the equitable defenses raised
by A.pp.ellant Juhan were not sustained.
6.

7.

The rights of Appellant Juhan are adequately defined.

8. No question raised by Appellant Juhan remains undecided.
9. ·The decision is correct as a matter of law and is sustained

by the facts.
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Civil No. 7723

In the Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
N.J. MEAGHER,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

JoE T. JuHAN, PAUL STocK, RAY PHEBus,
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.

ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING.
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah:
Respondent does not presume to suggest that this court
lacks power to grant rehearing if it so desires. Yet, in
the orderly administration of justice, the highest courts,
including this one, recognize that litigation must have an
end, and therefore have developed self-imposed limitations upon the privilege of rehearing.
The traditional grounds for rehearing are well established. Rehearing is not granted unless a decisive question has been overlooked or the court is apprehensive that
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error has been made with respect to an important principle of law. Essentially, the limitation upon rehearing is
that it will not be employed as a device to give the losing
party another day in court merely to reargue issues which
have been clearly raised, thoroughly argued and briefed,
and definitely decided.
Notwithstanding that the petition at bar charges this
court with error as to nearly every point covered by the
opinion, it does not urge that anything was overlooked or
was not considered. It could not do so in the face of an
opinion so throughly considered and so clearly expressed.
Any suggestion that an important principle of law was
erroneously decided is subject to two answers: first, no
error was committed, and, second, no new or important
principle of law is involved. This case makes no oil law.
The decision merely determines the legal effect of a document which transferred to respondent Meagher the interest in an oil lease formerly owned by appellant Stock.
True, the opinion necessarily applies the well-established
principle that interests in oil leases are subject to division and co-ownership. But although the petition skirts
the edges of a challenge to this principle, it carefully
avoids direct attack. Counsel for petitioners are well
aware that it is part and parcel of the oil business to
divide and subdivide the various types of oil titles and
interests. Thus, lacking any traditional basis for rehearing, the petition seeks to re-argue the entire case.
Appellants have not seen fit to correlate the specifica..
tions of error with their argument. To avoid conf:usion,
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this reply will be addressed to petitioners' argument section by section.

ARGUMENT.

I.
The court's opinion does not hold that its former decision determined the legal effect of the transfer from
Stock to Meagher. The first opinion noted the existence
of such a transfer, but clearly declined to decide any
issue pertinent to its effect. The current opinion holds
that the Stock-to-Meagher transfer does have the legal
effect of passing to Meagher the lessee's rights then
owned by Stock.
The Stock-to-Meagher document does contain words of
grant which render it indistinguishable in legal effect
from a quitclaim deed. This point was thoroughly briefed
and considered. The final clause contained in the granting clause of the document, which reads, "insofar as it
conveys the lands described,'' might be deemed surplusage in view of the fact that the previous words of
grant are sufficient to transfer Stock's interest. But if
the reader of the document is in any doubt as to the intention of the transferor, the additional phrase quoted
above confirms the intention of Stock to pass his interest
in the leasehold as an interest in the lands described.

II.
In this section, petitioners ignore the fact that this case
is now limited to the determination of the ownership of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the le,ssees' interests in a leasehold which has previously
been held by this court to be valid. All leases contain
terms which require performance of various acts by the
lessees. The mere fact that oil leases contain clauses requiring lessees to perform particular acts does not convert them to mere ''performance contracts'' (a phrase petitioners have coined for rehearing purposes only).
Moreover, Dil leases are particularly subjeet to division
of int·erests and to ownership in eo-tenancy. It was an
undivided one-half interest in the rights of the lessee
which was owned by Stock. So long as he owned that interest, and so long as he wished to retain it, he was subject to the various obligations of performance contained
in the lease. He transferred it to Meagher. The remainin_g Qne-half interest in the lease was then owned -by
Phebus, who later transferred it to Juhan. These very
petitioners, in their unrecorded agreements made between
themselves years ago, recognized the divisibility of the
interest owned by Stock from that owned by Phebus. They
expressly referr.ed to Stock's "half inter-est". In this
connection, note Exhibits A-48 and A-49. Exhibits A-49 is
the unrecorded agreem.ent between Juhan and Charles S.
Hill. It was entered into January 5, 1946. It contains
the following language:
''A 121h% inter-est in the said recovery from th~
above described acreage belongs to said Stock, based
on his ·half interest, when and if the title to his interest is sustained by a court of competent jurisdiction, or if his former interest is adjudicated as belonging to N. J. Meagher, then, and in such event,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the said Stock shall have no interest.'' (emphasis
ours.)
The document from 'vhich the above staten1ent is quoted
is one of several disclosing the Stock-Hill-Juhan arrangements made for the purpose of dividing up the half interest Stock had transferred to l\leagher, if Juhan should
succeed in wresting it back from Meagher. It was clearly
understood that Stock would get nothing if Juhan should
not be successful in the anticipated litigation which is
this case.
The foregoing illustrates the readiness with which petitioners themselves treated these leasehold interests as
divisible. The practice of dealing with oil leases and
other oil interests as undivided tenancies in common is so
universal as to require no further elaboration.

III.
In this section, we are again confronted with the thriceargued question of whether Meagher could properly plead,
in his amended reply, the interest in the lease which he
acquired from Stock. When he filed his original complaint, he claimed all legal interests and titles in the land
by asserting that he was the owner in fee simple. Then
Stock transferred his interest to Meagher, at which point,
Meagher, believing the lease to be a nullity, continued to
assert his claim to ownership of all outstanding interests. Then Juhan filed his answer, claiming ownership of
the lease by assignments from Stock as to one-half and
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from Phebus as to the other half. Then this court held
the lease to be valid, but it did not pass upon the question of who owned what interests therein. Then Meagher,
having claimed all rights in the land, filed his amended
reply to conform his claim to the limitations which had
been imposed by this court in its first decision. Meagher's
amended reply was in fact nothing more than a clarification of the remaining issues.
Petitioners, in this section, again refer to the lessees'
rights under the lease as being mere contractual rights
and argues that such rights cannot be encompassed by a
pleading which claims all interests in the property.
Petitioners refer to the lease as a mere ''performance
contract'', speak of ''contractual rights'' and assiduously
avoid calling the interest what all know it to be, namely,
an undivided one-half interest in an oil lease.

IV.
This section continues the above argument. It deals
with the undivided interest in the lease which was owned
by Stock as something Stock could not transfer. The
absence of authorities is noteworthy. Of all the various
types of legal interests evolved by the ingenuity of industry, respondent submits that none is more generally
recognized as being transferable and divisible into undivided fractions than oil interests.
Of course Stock could not assign away rights which
Phebus owned or rights which Juhan acquired through
Phebus. From Phebus, Juhan did acquire an undivided
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one-half interest in this lease. "vVhat are those rights t"
ask petitioners, but they kno'v full well what these rights
are, and no clarification of the opinion is required to spell
them out. They are the rights to explore the lands and to
produce oil. They are subject to the lessor's rights owned
by the landowner, and they are also subject to the equal
co-extensive lessee's rights owned by the co-lessee. They
can be exercised 'vith or without the co-operation of the
co-tenant. The legal consequences of such action are well
established. The mere fact that the lessor and the co-lessee
are one person-Meagher in this case-makes no difference, and results in no merger. As lessor, Meagher has
certain rights and obligations fixed by the lease. As colessee, he shares identical rights and obligations as are
enjoyed by Juhan and his assigns. No merger of the two
estates held by Meagher is involved because of the existence of the rights of Juhan and assigns. These principles are elementary and well-known to petitioners. No
further elaboration of them by this court is called for.

v.
This section deals with the subject of consideration,
a point strenuously urged by appellants throughout the
case, decided adversely to them each time, and expressly
laid to rest in the opinion under attack. The petitioners
ask: "What obligations of performance were passed on
to Meagher in his role of landlord~'' The answer to this
question discloses its cunning but disproves its sincerity.
As landlord, Meagher undertook no obligations when he
received
Stock's undivided half interest in the lease. But,
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8
as co-lessee with the Phebus-Juhan group, he obtained the
same rights and became subject to the same obligations
that had previously been enjoyed and borne by Stock.
Moreover, by virtue of the transfer, Stock was no longer
obligated as lessee.
In this section which deals with consideration, petitioners conclude by saying:
"The Modification Agreement, once oil has been
discovered, carries with it a long-term obligation of
performance involving the expenditure of many thousands of dollars.''
Surely appellees are not urging that Stock is still subject to those obligations notwithstanding his tranfer to
Meagher. Confusion is possible at this point, since Stock
subsequently purchased an interest from Juhan out of the
Phebus line of title, as to which he, of course, assumes
lessee obligations. But these obligations have no bearing
upon his former interest which he transferred to Meagher.
Irrelevant to the subject of consideration, but in this
section of the petition, it is argued that, since Meagher,
as landlord, could gain if the lease were defaulted, he is
an antagonistic co-tena!lt who can force the other cotenants to carry the financial load and risk. But Meagher,
as co-tenant, is merely the successor of Stock, and certainly, if Stock had retained his interest and had not seen
fit to contribute to the cost of exploration, his co-tenants
could not have forced him to act otherwise. They would
have been in the same position as any co-lessee whose
associates will not take an active part in development. In
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such cases, the aetive co-tenant can proceed alone. If he
fails to get production, the loss is his. If he succeeds, he
can charge the inactive co-tenant 'vith the latter's share
of proper expenses provided he has not been guilty of
over-reaching the inactive co-tenant In the latter situation, the law grants full recovery to the inactive cotenant, free of the expense offset. But the point here is
that Juhan and assigns are in no different position after
Meagher acquired .Stock's rights than they were before.
There is no principle of law which requires a eo-tenant
to default his rights because of antagonism toward or by
his associates.

VI.
Here petitioners attack the determination that Stock's
interest passed to Meagher. They ask: "What was the
interest, and how did it pass''' The answer to this question has been repeatedly argued, briefed, and twice decided. The interest was an undivided one-half interest in
the rights of the lessee under the leasehold. It passed by
virtue of a signed document from Stock to Meagher. It
transferred to Meagher whatever interest Stock had in
that leasehold.
Petitioners repeat that the rights of Juhan and assigns and their relationship to Meagher are not determined. This point has been answered above. There
is no .issue before this court under which this court may
now decide how these parties must conduct themselves in
the future as co-tenants. It is not the province of the
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court to anticipate hypothetical controversies. The issue
here is to determine ownership and title, and that determination has been made.
Petitioners argue that Juhan and assigns were not
put on notice that Meagher claimed or could claim an assignment of Stock's interest. The quick answer is found
in Exhibits A-48 and A-49 discussed above. They were
not only notified of Meagher's claim by his complaint, but
they actually knew about it and were so apprehensive
that they carefully and expressly agreed between themselves that Stock would get nothing by virtue of his
former interest unless Juhan, financed by Dougan, could
succeed in defeating Meagher's claim in this litigation.

VII.
Petitioners' concluding section asserts that the issues
of laches and estoppel against Meagher have not been
determined. The defenses were pled and twice decided
adversely to petitioners. Throughout the case, petitioners
have sought to make it appear that they are persons who,
without knowledge of outstanding claims, have innocently spent their money to develop the property. This
presents a strong equitable position, but the facts are
otherwise. What these petitioners did was to spend their
money after Meagher had sued. This litigation was commenced before petitioners spent a single dollar in oil development. When they did make their expenditures, they
knew that Meagher had an outstanding claim; they knew
his litigation was still pending; they had discussed it
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among themselves, and they had even made provision
for it in their private agreements. One cannot build
an estoppel by clailning he relied on the hope that his
adversary "~ouJd overlook his rights.
The point that possibly innocent purchasers have a position here is touched upon so ligh~ly that respondent
cannot tell ""rhether it is actually asserted. Certainly
throughout this protracted litigation no such position has
been taken. The petition says that, "As to Juhan, Weber
and Equity, this court makes no expression of principles
of right, justice or morality.'' Any suggestion that Juhan,
at any stage of the proceedings, was an innocent purchaser for value without notice is ridiculous. As to Weber
and Equity, Juhan's assignees, the record is clear that the
commencement of this litigation and the lis pe-vndens thereunder (which was filed by petitioner's counsel), preceded
the acquisition of any interest by these companies. Exhibit A-49 discloses that J. L. Dougan (an officer and director of Equity and Weber), as of January 5, 1946, had
agreed to finance this litigation to support whatever title
Juhan had obtained by assignment from Phebus as to onehalf of the lease and from Stock as to the other half.
This claimed interest from Stock was obtained by Juhan
via Chas. S. Hill after Stock had transferred to Meagher
and all concerned had full knowledge of that transfer and
full knowledge that this litigation was then pending. For
any of these parties to seek the role of an innocent dealing
without notice was too obviously untenable to assert below.
Certainly it cannot first become an issue upon rehearing.
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This section suggests that this court's opinion condones reprehensible conduct. Respondent submits that the
converse is true; the court has merely refused to yield
to the false equities asserted by petitioners.
The statement in the petition that petitioners share
their reward "with a sizeable portion of our citizenry"
has ·not escaped our notice. The suggestion that this
court will consider any political factor in reaching its decision is unthinkable. But it does disclose the weakness of
petitioners' legal position.

CONCLUSION.

Respondent respectfully submits th;:tt this litigation has
been thoroughly presented and considered. One by one
the arguments presented by petitioners have been met
and answered. Any suggestion that this court has not
given the matter thorough and ample consideration is refuted by the opinion itself. It is not a basis for rehearing
that substantial values are involved. Petitioners have had
their day in court. Respondent submits that this protracted litigation should be brought to an end and the
petition denied.
Dated, April9, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT vAN DAM,
GILBERT

c. WHEAT,

Attorneys for Respondent
N.J. Meagher.
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